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Kenya: The Struggle to Create a Democracy 
Kenya provides a useN illustration of the challenges a 
newly independent nation faces in structuring a government 
that will best represent its people. The Kenyan leaders chose to 
adopt a Western form similar to that found in Britain for their 
Independence Constitution. Many of those who participated in 
its creation, however, expected that the Independence 
Constitution would blend with the unique culture of Kenya, 
creating an independent government that would truly 
represent the will of the Kenyan populace. The constitution 
imported from the West would merely be "a valuable ingredient 
in the construction of a home-grown constitution,"' rather than 
the definitive basis of Kenyan government. 
This comment focuses on the growing pains that have come 
with converting a western constitution into a democratic, 
"home grown constitution" that responds to and reflects the 
needs of the Kenyan people. First, it is necessary to explain my 
use of the term "democracy." In pre-colonial Kenya, various 
tribal democracies survived because of the communities' small 
size and homogeneity; each community's leaders accurately 
represented the interests and ideals of the group.2 Tribal 
leaders were chosen and evaluated "entirely upon [their] 
behavior . . . to [the] group and to the community at large."3 
Democracies were sustained through the leaders' intimate 
connection with and reflection of the local culture and people. 
1. J.B. OJWANG, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA; INSTITUTIONAL 
ADAPTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 211-12 (1990). 
2. JOMO KEWATTA, FACING MOUNT KENYA 186, 195-96 (1953). 
3. Id. a t  195. The native Africans resented foreign rule, in part, because 
they did not regard their British leaders "as the true representatives of the 
interests of the community." Id. at 196. Kenyatta is speaking specifically about the 
Gikuyu tribe but all of Kenya's ethnic communities formed communities around 
similar principles. See IRVING KAPLAN ET. AL, AREA HANDBOOK FOR mNYA 106 
(1976) (stating that all of Kenya's ethnic groups share "fundamental principles of 
social organization and group formation based on kinship, age and neighborhood"). 
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One of the challenges of the new, independent Kenyan 
government was to design a government whose representatives 
would be viewed by each of the 64 or more tribes as their 
legitimate leader. Legitimization was essential because Kenyan 
leaders had to deal with the possibility of fragmentation and 
political competition between tribes. Obviously, the post- 
colonial Kenya was more difficult to manage democratically 
than the individual tribal units were. Initially, the demands of 
unity may have required more stringent control by a 
centralized leader. The Kenyan leaders, however, have not 
encouraged an evolution toward a more democratic governance. 
I will discuss two related reasons why the post-colonial Kenyan 
government has, conversely, moved away from a truly 
representative government toward a government of centralized 
power. 
First, because Kenya never went through a revolution, but 
instead won liberation through a series of compromises, 
government power was passed into the hands of the African 
ruling party and has never effectively been turned over to the 
people. Although the first African leaders were elected by 
popular vote, the present government officials have 
strengthened their position through denying Kenyans some 
individual freedoms, such as the freedom to associate and the 
freedom to participate in the political process, and through 
perpetuating a one-party system. This continued concentration 
of power is a form of neocolonialism, impeding Kenya's advance 
toward true independence. 
Second, the native people remain unempowered in part 
because the culture of traditional Kenya still affects the 
operation of government. The emphasis on community identity 
shapes the native people's expectation of their government and 
their relationship with others in the society. Traditional 
Afsican thought defines an individual's rights by the needs of 
the community, as opposed to the Western culture which 
defines a community as a group of individuals with inalienable 
rights. In Kenya, for example, a law that limits an individual's 
ability to speak out against the government may be viewed by 
a native Kenyan as a redefinition, rather than a denial, of his 
rights because the community goal of unity is furthered by the 
law. The communal nature of the native Africans also leads to 
the problem of tribalism, which is used as a justification by the 
Kenyan government to concentrate power. I will discuss both 
the power held by the Kenyan government and the culture 
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upheld across Kenyan society, focusing on their 
operation of law and the interpretation of 
Constitution. 
11. CONCENTRATED POWER OF THE KENYAN 
A. History of Colonization 
In order to understand Kenya's rebuilding 
effects on the 
the Kenyan 
process, it is 
necessary to understand how European Kenya's government 
became under ~olonization.~ Although Western influence in 
Africa began much earlier through contact with Christian mis- 
sionariesY5 British control of present-day Kenya began on Sep- 
tember 3,1888, when a charter was given to the Imperial Brit- 
ish East Africa Company ("IBEAC"). The replacement of British 
law for the laws of the indigenous tribes was gradual. During 
this early period the British government's interests were solely 
commercial and because Kenya's indigenous governmental 
structure did not interfere, i t  was not replaced wholesale. The 
charter given the IBEAC 'laid down certain directives of policy 
in the matter of human rights which the Company was bound 
to carry out. . . . It was not to interfere in matters of religion. It 
was to preserve the customs and laws of the tribes of 
Near the end of the nineteenth century, the British built a 
railway across Kenya to access Uganda. To make the railway 
profitable, the British declared the territory of Kenya a 'White 
Man's Country" where European settlers would take all the 
best agricultural land and try to produce goods to be trans- 
ported by the railway.' At this point the British began to con- 
trol the laws of Kenya in order to protect the rights of the Eu- 
ropean property owners. 
Kenya became a British Protectorate in 1895 when the 
IBEAC experienced financial difficulties, causing the British to 
assert greater control in order to protect their vested interests 
in Africa. From 1895 to 1915 a "colonial bureaucratic hierarchy 
4. See ROBERT L. TIGNOR, THE COLONIAL TRANSFORUATION OF KENYA (1976). 
5. Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama arrived at present-day Kenya with 
Roman Catholic missionaries in 1498. 
6. Chanan Singh, The Republican Constitution of Kenya: Historical Back- 
ground and Analysis, 14 INT'L AND COMP LQ 878, 885 (1965). 
7 .  See NORMAN MILLER & RODGER YEAGER, KENYA: THE QUEST FOR PROS- 
P E R ~  11-13 (2d ed. 1994); INDEPENDENT KENYA 3 (1982) (written by a group of 
anonymous Kenyan citizens); J. FORBES MUNRO, COLONIAL RULE AND THE KAMBA 
(1975). 
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was structured, the lowest rung of which consisted of govern- 
ment chiefs and headmen grafted onto and supervising existing 
systems of age-grade and kinship authority."* European mis- 
sionaries organized the schools, clinics, and African Christian 
congregations, while British settlers "flooded" the  highland^.^ 
During this time, the European settlers created an almost 
exclusively European legislative council with the purpose of 
transferring power away from the indigenous people.1° The 
East African Land Ordinance, which allowed Africans to occupy 
land but not to hold title, set in place the "final stone of colo- 
nial occupation."" 
In 1920, the Kenya Protectorate was formally annexed and 
became the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya. Clause 10 of the 
1920 Letters Patent "invalidates any Kenya law which was 
repugnant to 'the law of England.'"12 This rejection of Kenyan 
law and leadership saw no sign of reversal until 1944 when the 
first African was appointed to the council. 
B. Independence 
From 1922-1952 the Kenyans used passive methods of 
resistance, such as establishing independent schools, newspa- 
pers, and religious groups.13 After World War I1 the resistance 
movements became more militant.14 In 1952 the Kikuyu se- 
cret society, Mau Mau, began violent attacks on British lead- 
ers? The return of Jomo Kenyatta to Kenya in 1946 as the 
8. MILLER & YEAGER, supra note 7, at 15. 
9. Id. 
10. Singh, supra note 6, at 889. The only non-European on the council was 
A.M. Jeevanjee, an Indian Merchant. Id. 
11. MILLER & YEAGER, supra note 7, at  15. Technically, because of Kenya's 
protectorate status, it still had to be treated as a foreign country by the British. 
Singh, supnz note 6, a t  888. 
12. Singh, supm note 6, at 889. 
13. Some separation between the Afkican Christian converts and the Christian 
missionaries was over disagreements on the importance of traditional customs. This 
separation led to the propagation of independent facilities. See infra, note 66. 
14. World War I1 was an important watershed for the African nationalist 
movement. Returning African troops brought home "a new political sophistication 
resulting from their rejection of whitesupremacy myths and their desire for a 
better future." MILLER & YEAGER, supra note 7, at 24; see JOHN LAMPHEAR, THE 
SCATTERING TIME (1992); INDEPENDENT KENYA, supra note 7, at 9-10. 
15. See also KENYA'S FREEDOM STRUGGLE (Maina wa Kinyatti ed., 1987). For 
detailed accounts of the Mau Mau movement and its continued effects on Kenyan 
society see ROBERT BUIJTENHUIJS, MAU MAU: TWENTY YEARS AFTER (1973); FRED 
MAJDALANY, STATE OF EMERGENCY (1962). 
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leader of the Kenya African Union ("KAU") added to the mo- 
mentum of the nationalist movement in Kenya. KAU's mem- 
bership grew to 150,000 by 1950. This steady increase in sup- 
port and the ensuing rise in nationalist fervor "made possible 
considerable cross-ethnic agreement on land issues and on per- 
ceptions of socioeconomic inequity."16 Finally, in 1960, in order 
to facilitate a peaceful resolution that would protect British 
interests, the British agreed to hold Independence Conferences 
where the new Kenyan Independence Constitution was created. 
A brief analysis of the series of Independence Conferences 
shows the power that the British government exercised in 
shaping the post-colonial Kenyan government and also the 
character of the Kenyans who assumed power in the wake of 
colonialism. l7 
1. Independence Conference of 1960 
Although the Kenyan people had united in opposition to 
outside rule, they did not present a unified front at the first 
Independence Conference in 1960 at  the Lancaster House. 
Chanan Singh believes that at this point the British govern- 
ment was ready to give the Kenyan delegation whatever the 
Kenyans requested in general agreement among themsel~es.'~ 
However the unofficial delegation from Kenya, made up of 19 
&cans, 17 Europeans, 8 Asians and 3 Arabs, did not present 
a cohesive voice, and so the British government "influence[d] 
decisions ~onsiderably."'~ The Conference delegates decided to 
build the Kenyan government around the Westminster model. 
This combination of Western government and native reali- 
ties was awkward.20 A government styled after the Westmin- 
ster model determines leadership according to political repre- 
sentation in the Parliament. The Kenyan African National 
16. MILLER & YEAGER, supra note 7, a t  24. The Kenyan nationalists were 
also encouraged by India's achievement of independence from the British in 1947. 
Id. 
17. See BRUCE BERMAN, CONTROL & CRISIS IN COLONIAL KENYA 408-17 
(1990)(stating that the Conference negotiations illustrate the combined effect of 
Kenya's nationalist pressure and the British government's manipulation to maintain 
somk control). 
18. Singh, supm note 6, a t  893. 
19. Id. 
20. J.B. Ojwang indicates that "this [Westminster] prototype could not work, 
because of a local factor." OJWANG, supra note 1, a t  35. Kenyan experience proves 
that a Westminster-type government cannot work without "congenial local circum- 
stances." Id. 
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Union ("KANU")21, the largest political party in Kenya at  that 
time, was therefore given the opportunity to form a govern- 
ment. The KANU refused because of the British government's 
restrictions against a number of leading African politicians, 
including Jomo Kenyatta who was in jail at the time. The Ken- 
yan African Democratic Union ("KADU"),22 Kenya's second 
largest party, was then invited to form a government. This 
created a confusion of power: the KADU had the authority to 
create a government without a mandate fiom the people be- 
cause the KANU still held Parliamentary control.23 
As a consequence, there developed a lack of mutual trust 
which led to widening differences of opinion and divisive politi- 
cal maneuverings in this phase of constitutional develop- 
ment.24 The Kenyan people were concerned over the nations 
ability to unite; "[Tlribal fears and suspicions over land and 
power [heightened] to such an extent that it raised grave 
doubts over the stability of an independent Kenya."25 
2. Independence Conference of 1962 
These two political parties represented Kenya at the 1962 
Conference. Again, Kenyans were disadvantaged because these 
two groups fought against each other and did not represent the 
collective native Kenyans' interests. "If there had been an 
'African' point of view as such, it would obviously have won. 
But the fact is that the parties to negotiations were the KANU 
and KADU, not Africans and others, and they had their sup- 
21. The "core membership" of the KANU was drawn from the KAU, which 
had been formed by Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga during Kenyatta's prison de- 
tention. MILLER & YEAGER, supra note 7, a t  30. The KANU receives support from 
two of Kenya's largest ethnic groups-the Kikuyu and the Luo. The KANU sup- 
ported a large national and unitary government, which would ensure their contin- 
ued dominance in the National Assembly. See Singh, supra note 6, a t  894. 
22. The KADU, organized by Daniel arap Moi and Ronald Ngala, had less 
power than the KANU in the National Assembly, but had many supporters in the 
outlying areas of the Colony. The KADU favored a regional form of government 
under which Kenya would be divided into five regions and one Extra-Region Area. 
This structure would allow the KADU to capitalize on their strength in 
less populated areas of Kenya. See Singh, supra note 6, at  894. 
23. MILLER & YEAGER, supra note 7, a t  31-32. The KADU had won only 19 
percent of the popular vote and 30 percent of African support in the 1961 election. 
Id. 
24. See MILLER & YEAGER, supm note 7, a t  30. 
25. M ~ R  & YEAGER, supra note 7, at  32 (quoting CARL G. RASBERG, JR., & 
JOHN NOTTINGHAM, THE MYTH OF "MAU MAU": NATIONALISM IN KENYA 319 (1966). 
KENYA 
porters among Europeans and Asians and Arabs."26 The con- 
flict between the two groups resulted in the formation of alli- 
ances between factions from inside and outside Kenya, dividing 
and overpowering Kenya's indigenous interests at  the Confer- 
e n ~ e . ~ '  
3. Independence Conference of 1963 
Such counterproductive politics subsided in 1963 when, as 
a result of the elections, the KANU obtained majority rule and 
Kenyatta (now released) became the undisputed leader. On 
June 1, 1963, internal self-government was introduced into 
Kenya and December 12, 1963 was declared the Date of Inde- 
pendence. The Independence Conference was held at  Lancaster 
House from September 25 to October 19, 1963. Negotiations 
took place between the British and a united, democratically 
elected Kenyan delegation. Finally Kenya's voice sounded in 
unison a t  the conferences. There was, however, a European 
delegation which had received approval for special representa- 
tion at the Conferen~e.~~ 
Provisions in the Independence Constitution adopted at 
this Conference mirrored the Western constitutions' recognition 
of individual rights (assuring the European settlers that the 
land and wealth they had amassed during the colonization 
would be protected) yet made these rights subject to significant 
exceptions. For example, Section 80 of the Kenyan Constitution 
gives every person the "freedom of assembly and association," 
subject to government actions "reasonably required in the in- 
terests of defense, public safety, public order, public morality or 
public health."29 This broad exception allows the government 
26. Singh, supra note 6, a t  897. 
27. See MILLER & YEAGER, supra note 7, a t  32. 
28. Singh, supra note 6, a t  898-99. 
29. Kenyan Constitution 8 80. Section 70 gives every person in Kenya: 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the 
right, whatever his race, tribe, place of origin or residence or other local 
comexion, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect 
for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest, to each 
and all of the following, namely- 
(a) life, 'liberty, security of the person and the protection of the law; 
(b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association; 
and 
(c) protection for the privacy of his home and other property and from 
deprivation of property without compensation, the provisions of this chap- 
ter shall have effect for the purpose of affording protection to those rights 
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to pass legislation limiting the freedom of association and reli- 
gion, like the Public Order Act and the Societies Act, and to 
take actions limiting the people's access to the political process. 
C. Evidence of Neocolonialism 
The preceding history illustrates the extent that a Europe- 
an governmental structure replaced Kenya's traditional govern- 
mental structure and how negotiations resulted in a blending 
of the Western governmental structure and Kenya's unique 
political past. In Independent Kenya3', a group of anonymous 
Kenyan citizens write that in order for an independent Kenya 
to have arisen out of colonialism, there needed to be a clean 
break or revolution. "In Amilcar Cabral's words, 'it is necessary 
to totally destroy, to break, to reduce to ash all aspects of the 
colonial state' before independence can be a~hieved."~' Be- 
cause Kenya's colonization ended through negotiation and com- 
promise, and "[nlo colonial ruling power has ever voluntarily 
relinquished hegemony at a negotiating table," the authors 
claim the British handed over only "nominal power" at the 
Independence Conferences." As a result the anonymous Ken- 
yans believe the Kenyan people never had the opportunity to 
create a democratic government and to escape control by a 
centralized power base. 
and freedoms subject to such limitations of that protection as are con- 
tained in those provisions, being limitations designed to ensure that the 
enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any individual does not 
prejudice the rights and freedoms of others of the public interest. 
Kenyan Constitution § 70. 
Section 78 gives the freedom of conscience, including the right to freedom of 
religion and freedom to change religion, and establishes the right of religious com- 
munities to maintain religious schools but the section also states that 
[nlothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the 
extent that the law in question makes provision which is reasonably re- 
quired- 
(a) in the interests of defense, public safety, public order, public morality 
or public health. 
Kenyan Constitution 8 78. 
Section 79 recognizes the freedom of expression but again limits the right with- 
in the bounds "reasonably required in the interests of defense, public safety, public 
order, public morality or public health." Kenyan Constitution Q 79. 
30. INDEPENDENT KENYA, supra note 7, at 13-16. 
31. Id. at 13. 
32. Id. at 13. 
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Neocolonialism has many definitions, but the definition 
that best fits the Kenyan authors' arguments is from Colin 
Leys: "Neo-colonialism results 'where the transition from 
colonialism to independence permitted the relatively efficient 
transfer of political power to a regime based on the support of 
social classes linked very closely to foreign  interest^.'"^ The 
Kenyan authors argue that the Kenyans in control of the gov- 
ernment now were closely tied to British interests during the 
colonization and have continued to keep power centralized. 
"!l?hose who emerged to rule us in 1963 were, in many cases, 
those who had betrayed our freedom fighters. They were the 
loyalists, whose co-operation with the murderers of our people 
bought them privileges and wealth."34 The Kenyan authors 
claim that during this transition time toward independence the 
new government emphasized continuity of power rather than 
the creation of a new government designed to meet the needs of 
the Kenyan people.35 
This character assessment of the Kenyan governmental 
leaders obviously presents numerous debatable interpreta- 
ti on^:^ but as support for their case that the Kenyan govern- 
33. DAVID F. GORDON, DECOLONIZATION A D THE STATE IN KENYA 250-51 
(1986) (quoting COLIN LEYS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT I  KENYA (1975)). Professor 
Gordon discusses the different definitions and chooses this definition because the 
definition focuses on the "relations between the new leadership and foreign inter- 
ests and the degree to which the new regime promotes change." Id. at 250. Profes- 
sor Gordon also discusses several valuative factors that may be used to determine 
whether a nation is a neo-colonial society. Id. at 251-52. He determines that Kenya 
does not meet this definition because the link with foreign interests is weak. 
My focus is not on the foreign connections the current Kenyan leaders have 
maintained. Instead, I wish to emphasize the continued centralization of power. 
The British government passed power into the hands of a few Kenyans and these 
leaders have continued to hold the power and to strengthen their position rather 
than gradually releasing the power to the Kenyan citizens. There are, however, 
evidences of pro-Western leanings in the Kenyan government's economic policy and 
foreign affairs. See MILLER & YEAGER, supm note 7, at 3, 56. 
34. INDEPENDENT KENYA, supra note 7, at 11-12. 
35. Id. 
36. Jomo Kenyatta, the first man elected President of independent Kenya and 
"the most important actor in Kenya's colonial and immediately postcolonial history" 
had ties to the British, but was a strong advocate of native rights. He brought 
grievances before Parliament and worked as a lobbyist for Kenyan nationalists 
during colonization. He was jailed by the British from 1952-1959 and detained 
after that for his suspected involvement with Mau Mau violence. During the latter 
part of his rule, however, Xenyatta became at once more autocratic and less will- 
ing or able to curb the political and economic excesses of those around him." MILL- 
ER & YEAGER, supra note 7, at  21, 29, 58-60; see &so GEORGE DEW, JOMO 
KENYATTA (1961). 
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ment has horded power, the authors point to several areas in 
which individual rights have been suppressed in order to con- 
centrate power in the Presidency. They claim the President 
maintains loyalty by "operat[ing] a rigid licensing system 
through which the government controls all gatherings of the 
people-no license, no meeting, no matter how inno~ent."~' 
The elections are showpieces for foreign, particularly Western 
nations, that are "devoid of debate on issues" and feature "safe 
personalities who have the KANU seal of approval."38 
These restrictions of personal freedoms have been docu- 
mented by other sources. The U.S. Department of State, in its 
1994 report on human rights in Kenya, relates an incident 
occurring January 17, 1993 that illustrates some of the limits 
the government has placed on religious exercise, even though 
the Kenyan Constitution recognizes the freedoms of religion, 
worship and asso~iation.~~ President Moi was holding a KANU 
rally and all students were instructed to attend. The headmis- 
tress of a girl's school interrupted a Seventh-day Adventist 
religious service and ordered the participating students to at- 
tend the political rally. When the students refused, they were 
expelled. The students were later readmitted and punished 
with forced manual labor.40 
The Kenyan government has also passed legislation limit- 
ing the fkeedom of association, including the fkeedom to associ- 
ate for religious purposes. The Public Order Act requires that a 
district commissioner approve meetings of ten or more people. 
By its language the Public Order Act does not apply to meet- 
ings for "social, cultural, charitable, recreational, religious, 
professional, commercial, or industrial purposes," but, accord- 
ing to the same U.S. Department of State Report, "[iln practice, 
meetings under all those categories fall under the jurisdiction 
of the Public Order Act."" The report claims that the govern- 
menta l  authori t ies  "routinely" restr ict  opposition 
parliamentarians' access to their constituents, breaking up 
meetings and preventing candidates from addressing the peo- 
37. INJIEPENDENT KENYA, supra note 7, at 15. 
38. Id. 
39. See supra note 29 
40. 1994 U.S. Dept. of State, Dept. of State Dispatch, Kenya Human Rights 
Practices, 1993, Section 2(c). 
41. Id. at 5 2Cb). 
42. Id. 
KENYA 
The Societies Act also restricts the Kenyan's freedom of 
association with even broader suppressive powers. Every "soci- 
ety," defined as "any club, company, partnership or other asso- 
ciation of ten or more persons, whatever its nature of object,"43 
must be recognized or exempted from registration by the Regis- 
trar of Societies. Without registration, a society is not allowed 
to hold meetings. The Kenyan Attorney General interprets the 
Act broadly, allowing the government to restrict even the ac- 
tions of registered religious organizations ." 
Additional restrictions have come through the  
government's manipulations of the democratic elections in 
Kenya. President Jomo Kenyatta, leader of the KANU party, 
was elected President by the National Assembly on December 
12, 1964. In 1968, the method of choosing the president 
changed to an election by popular vote. This power was not 
fully exercisable, however, because of the limited choice of 
candidates the people were given. 
In 1977, Oginga Odinga, a disenchanted former vice-presi- 
dent of Kenya,45 announced his intention to run for president. 
The KANU refused to permit him to run for office and later 
announced that the elections for president were postponed 
indefinitely. When President Kenyatta died in 1978, Vice-Presi- 
dent Moi assumed the position of Acting President, pending an 
election to be held within 90 days. Because the KANU constitu- 
tion required the president to be a member of a political party, 
and because the KANU was the only political party at that 
time, Moi (who was selected by the KANU) was the only nomi- 
nee for the presidential election. He was unanimously elected 
by the election delegates. Before the 1979 general election for 
president, 23 applicants for presidential candidacy were reject- 
ed, leaving President Moi again the sole candidate for the pres- 
idency. He was returned to office without an election." 
In 1982 the KANU government passed an amendment to 
the Constitution which made Kenya a de jure one-party state. 
Section 2(a) made it a requirement that an elected official be a 
member of the KANU party. 
43. Societies Act of Kenya (emphasis added). 
44. The Attorney General has used the Societies Act to prohibit a religious 
group from forming a political party. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
45. For an account of Odinga's disaffection with the KANU, see infia note 78 
and accompanying text. 
46. Albert P. Blaustein & Julio R. Menezes, Kenya, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
Co-s OF THE WORLD 4, 5 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gilbert H. F'lanz eds., 1981). 
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Meanwhile, President Moi's presidency was becoming in- 
creasingly unpopular with the Kenyans because of his strong- 
arm tactics and the corruption in his cabinet. The choice of can- 
didates in the 1988 elections was limited not only by Section 
2(a) of the constitution, but also by voter intimidation, ballot 
rigging and the blocking of candidates in the primary elec- 
tion." The suppression of free elections led to criticism from 
the Western world. In 1991, under pressure of reduced foreign 
aid, the KANU government vacated Section 2(a) and, at  least 
facially, opened up the elections to other political parties. 
D. The One-Party State 
A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a one- 
party state is helpful in this area because of the central role 
the political party plays in a democratic state. Since the disso- 
lution of the KADU party in 1964, Kenya has been first a de 
facto and then a de jure one-party system. Only recently has 
the political system been opened (at least superficially) to par- 
ties other than the KANU. 
It is interesting, however, that the authors of Independent 
Kenya, who complain about the oppressive tactics of the pres- 
ent government, believe true independence will arise under the 
leadership of one political party. "[Full independence] is the 
culmination of popular, protracted revolutionary change, during 
which the people seize control of the instruments of power 
under the leadership of a party dedicated to the eradication of 
the institutions and forms of the colonial state."48 The authors' 
criticisms of the KANU failure to provide a democratic state do 
not focus on the close association shared by KANU and the en- 
trenched government, but on the lack of connection between 
the party and the people. They argue that instead of eradicat- 
ing the forms of colonialism, the KANU leaders took the reigns 
handed to them by the British and continue to hold power 
within their small, elect group, ignoring native interests as had 
their predecessors to power." 
47. See MILLER & YEAGER, supra note 7, at 106. 
48. INDEPENDENT KENYA, supra note 7 ,  at 13 (emphasis added). 
49. The authors claim that "[slince only those Kenyans wealthy enough to 
afford to buy life membership [in the KANUI can be elected party officials, it 
serves as a rich man's club, whose members are dedicated to making themselves 
even richer." Id. at 15. 
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And so the question naturally arises: Are the suppressions 
of personal freedoms that occur in Kenya due in part to the 
existence of a one-party system or to the fact that this party 
does not adequately represent the voice of the people? There 
are several arguments on both sides of the debate. 
I .  A one-party state is necessary in situations demanding 
unity 
Tom Mboya, a Kenyan scholar, argues that in the wake of 
colonialism, a one-party system was the only practical course in 
the organization of new Afiican States. 
In the days of struggle against [foreign rule], . . . the minds of 
the people are preoccupied with their political troubles. They 
experience these troubles not as individuals but as a group 
. . . The essential point is that all opposition to foreign rule or 
a mono-racial rule comes &om what is to all intents and pur- 
poses a single political party.w 
The fact that this same party's leader, Jomo Kenyatta, who "by 
reason of his sacrifices in [the national] cause, is regarded by 
the masses as the leader, the hero, the father of the nation,"51 
becomes the leader of the new government "in itself works 
against the emergence of a multi-party system."52 In addition, 
because the party is busy in the work of nation building, any 
opposing parties distract the ruling party; the government will 
either act "as a steamroller ignoring the existence of the opposi- 
tion or [take] steps to put an end to opposition, for its own 
s ake-comple tely and permanently . n53 
A one-party system provides a practical vehicle for revolu- 
tion and, as mentioned above, facilitates the unity that has 
proven essential in post-colonial African countries. Because the 
pre-colonial government system dispersed power among in 
individual communities or tribes, there was the danger that 
when centralized power was taken away with the removal of a 
colonial head, Kenya would dissolve into various tribal groups 
50. OJWANG, supra note 1, at 46 (quoting T.J. Mboya, The Party System and 
Democracy in Africa, COMMONWEALTH CHALLENGE, 48-50 (1964)). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 47. 
53. Id. This helps explain the voluntary dissolution of the KADU in 1964. 
Upon the dissolution, R. Ngala, leader of the KADU party, urged all supporters of 
KADU and the KANU to "work together to build our nation socially, economically 
and politically." Id. 
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all claiming power and vying to take over the abandoned cen- 
tralized structure. The community identity of a tribe is based 
on kinship relation, and more expansively on ethnic identity, as 
distinguished f?om a national id en tit^.'^ The danger of "tribal- 
ism" is used as a justification by the Kenyan government for 
many of its restrictive actions.55 Whether or not a strong na- 
tional one-party government is still needed to create unity 
among the tribes, it is clear that the government uses the fear 
of the consequences of tribalism to limit its citizens' freedom of 
association, their right to participate effectively in the political 
process, and their right to exercise religious beliefs. 
A one-party system presents obvious dangers because of 
the concentration of power and lack of alternative voices. 
KANU founder, Oginga Odinga, advocated a one-party system 
as a vehicle for democracy only if "the mass of the people were 
associated with policy-making at all levels."56 Without leaders 
who were willing to further the nation's goals as freely ex- 
pressed by the people, the one-party system failed to create a 
democracy. And without a "united and powerful national move- 
ment neo-colonialism moved in and thri~ed."~' As discussed 
below, Odinga left the KANU party because of what he per- 
ceived to be a stifling of fkee political discourse. 
2. A one-party system may be necessary when a nation lacks 
diversity 
J.B. Ojwang argues that, outside practical concerns as to 
unity, a one-party system is the only viable government struc- 
ture for Kenya because of the "absence of a social structuring to 
sustain interest groups that would be the pillars of a party 
system."58 He claims this one factor is "the key to a proper 
understanding of the differing notions of democracy found in 
Africa and in the West."59 
54. Id. at 136. 
55. Hemed Said Bat-Haf, the ambassador of Kenya to Saudi Arabia, in an 
interview with a Saudi newspaper, attributes the political skirmishes that have 
occurred since the introduction of multiparty democracy to the problem of tribalism. 
"President Moi warn* Africa is not cohesive enough to implement a multiparty 
democratic system." (Not) the Whole Truth: Kenya-the Fight Goes; Interview with 
Hemed Said Bat-Haf, 8 INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT (August 31, 1994). 
56. OGINGA ODINGA, NOT YET UHURU 269 (1967). 
57. Id. 
58. OJWANG, supra note 1, at 48. 
59. Id. 
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He speaks of a ideal sort of diversity which creates an 
atmosphere of free thinking and private support for political 
views. This kind of diversity, evident in America and in certain 
European nations, "rests upon diverse class and status situa- 
tions which are built upon the diverse economies and societies 
obtaining in these countries."60 In the West we enjoy a tradi- 
tion of support for private societies such as churches, unions, 
academia, and political groups; this diversity results in con- 
stant clashing and competition, balancing and stabilizing the 
political power struggle along the ideological spectrum. And, as 
Ojwang points out, "61s the occurrence of diversity an act of 
will, which can readily be brought about in Kenya as in Britain 
or ~rance?"~'  
Because Kenya lacks the structure and tradition to support 
differentiation on class or status situations, "the main basis of 
differentiation and of broad-based group solidarity, a t  least for 
the time being [in Kenya], is communal, based on 64 or so 
ethnic groups."62 Thus, the introduction of a multiparty sys- 
tem-in the absence of a mature, inter-ethnic diversity of eco- 
nomic and social interests-would flow naturally into the de- 
fault interest demarcations: tribal  allegiance^.^^ 
Recent developments in Kenya seem to support this fear of 
ethnic schism, though KANU's incessant will to control has 
muddied any such worthy justifications for its one-party rule. 
ARer the amendment constitutionalizing the one-party state 
was repealed in 1991, the Islamic Party of Kenya ("IPK") at- 
tempted to register as a political party with the Registrar of 
Societies. The Registrar denied their petition. The Kenyan 
Attorney General supported the decision with a broad reading 
of the Societies Act. He maintained that "registering sectarian 
parties would contradict the spirit of the law, which proscribes 
organizations 'incompatible with peace, welfare, or good order 
in Kenya.'"64 As mentioned above, this reading of the Societies 
Act restricts the free exercise of religion as well as eliminates a 
political challenger. 
60. 
61. 
cussion 
current 
62. 
63. 
64. 
OJWANG, supra note 1, at 64. 
Id. at 64. See MILLER & YEAGER, supra note 7, at 55, 125-60, for a dis- 
of the theories of a developing Kenyan class structure and economy and 
economic realities in Kenya. 
OJWANG, supra note 1, at 65. 
See MILLER & YEAGER, supra note 7, at 55. 
1994 U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 40, at $ 2W. 
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The Muslims claim they have been "marginalized" by the 
Kenyan government since independence and that the denial of 
registration for the IPK is just the latest stone thrown in a 
shower of oppre~sion.~' To help ease tension, President Moi 
formed a Muslim movement in Mombasa, the United Muslims 
of Africa ("UMA"), but because the group was viewed as an 
extension of the existing government, its formation has just 
added to the conflict.66 The IPK's Sheikh Salim Balala was 
eventually arrested for threatening KANU leaders. Political 
violence in the region is increasing. 
The IPK conflict may illustrate Kenya's inability as yet to 
sustain a multiparty system structured around social and eco- 
nomic interests, in that it shows the primacy of ethnic and 
religious  division^.^' But the conflict may, instead, show that 
a multiparty democracy is not working now because the gov- 
ernment has institutionally stifled all but its own political and 
social freedom, thus prohibiting the growth that would support 
a democracy. 
Democratic governance entails far more than the legalization 
of opposition political parties. For a system of governance to 
be democratic, it must permit broad participation, not just in 
the form of opportunities to select candidates and to vote in 
elections, but also in eligibility for public office. It must be 
65. The Muslims crushed a mutiny against President Moi in 1982 and expect- 
ed some political repayment for their loyalty to the President. The fact that this 
payoff did not materialize added fuel to the fire. The Muslims also claim that 
Kenya's laws are incompatible with Islam and that they are under-represented in 
the legislature. 
66. The argument that the Kenyan government is just trying to separate 
religious organizations from politics fails in the face of President Moi's formation of 
the UMA. In fact, there is no tradition of chwch/state separation in Kenya. The 
traditional african culture taught that the peace within the community depended 
upon the observance of certain customs, and therefore the legal system was insepa- 
rable from the religious code. See Vincent Mulago, Traditional Religion and 
Christianity in AFRICAN TRADITIONAL RELIGIONS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY, 127 
(Jacob K. Olupona ed., 1991). 
The British system didn't introduce strict separation between church and state 
either. During colonialism, the British government maintained a special relationship 
with the Christian missionaries, allowing them to be involved in governmental 
decisions because of their responsibility for the establishment of schools and medi- 
cal clinics. See J.N.K. MUGAMBI, AFRICAN HERITAGE AND CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN- 
ITY, 10 (1989). 
67. Kenya's political conflicts, although primarily ethnic, are not however, 
limited to ethnic clashes. For example, in January 1992 more than 100,000 people 
participated in an anti-government demonstration, led by Odinga. MILLER & 
YEAGER, supra note 7, a t  111. 
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inclusive. It must also ensure the ability to contest public 
policy . . . through a variety of other guarantees, including 
freedom to associate, to speak out on policy matters, to gather 
and dispense information subject to libel laws, and so on. 
Democratic governance is a package of guarantees and institu- 
tions to support them." 
Although the Kenyan government repealed the constitutional 
amendment making it a de jure one-party state, the KANU is 
making frantic efforts to retain power through intimidation and 
political manipulations." Simply eliminating a constitutional 
amendment is not enough to create a multiparty system when 
there have been no supporting actions, especially in light of 
Kenya's history of de facto single party rule. The Public Order 
Act and the Societies Act, along with the tremendous power 
wielded by the KANU, still restrict the operation of a multipar- 
ty system in Kenya. 
3. A multiparty system provides the opportunity for democrat- 
ic governance 
The arguments in favor of a one-party democratic system 
focus on the necessity of the arrangement to unify the nation 
and to allow a developing nation to become diversified along 
other than ethnic lines. It is clear, however, that on theoretical 
grounds "there is a clear link between multi-partyism and the 
broader achievement of democratic governan~e."~~ A multipar- 
ty system "improves the ability of the governed to hold the 
governors to account for their actions, for their fulfillment of 
the obligations they acquired in assuming leader~hip."~' It 
provides a forum where "the constant struggle to secure and 
preserve the other elements of democratic governance can be 
waged without resort to violence."72 
68. JENNIFER A. WIDNER, THE RISE OF A PARTYSTATE IN KENYA 227 (1993) 
(emphasis added). 
69. It seems from statistics that strong-arming is what is required to keep 
the KANU in power. A poll conducted by a Kenyan magazine after the repeal of 
Section 2(a) in 1991 found that almost 80 percent of its readers preferred the 
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy ("FORD"), a newly registered political 
party headed by Odinga, while only 1.29 percent supported the KANU. See MILLER 
& YEAGER, supra note 7, at 108. Subsequent factional disagreements in FORD 
have limited its effediveness as a force to counter the KANU. 
70. WIDNER, supra note 68, at  227. 
71. Id. at  226. 
72. Id. at  227. 
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And so, if practically possible, a multiparty system offers 
the best assurance of free and active democracy, and the lead- 
ers in a one-party system who seek to insure a democratic 
governance of the people should implement the institutions and 
policies which will support a multiparty system. Extending one- 
party rule beyond what was arguably an initial period of neces- 
sity will swallow Kenya's democratic progress in a new form of 
totalitarianism. "mhe protracted existence of a single-party 
system and attacks against ability to associate outside the 
confines of a party can shape interest-group structure and 
modify the effects of private enterpri~e."~~ Those members of 
society who are in a "position to reduce state control may, for 
different reasons, remain outside politics. Some fail to enter 
politics because they cannot conceive of such a thing."74 
The Kenyan government, rather than encouraging the 
development of a multi-party system, has acted to restrict per- 
sonal freedoms in order to increase its centralized power." 
This is the complaint the anonymous Kenyan authors voiced 
against the operation of their government-that the 
government's abuse of their centralized power has impeded 
Kenya's growth towards democracy. 
The history of collusion between the Executive branch and 
the KANU party exposes the latter's desertion of its proper 
legislative function of popular representation. In 1965 and 
1966, the government of Kenya showed "considerable govern- 
mental impatience with disintegrative party a~tivities."~~ The
forum where party grievances could be heard was terminated 
and critics of the party's direction were removed from party 
positions. "Open debate on party matters fizzled out, and the 
basis of what remained of party activity became, in the first 
place, the initiative of the Executive, and in the second place, 
alignments centered on  individual^."^^ Former KANU leader, 
Oginga Odinga, explained that 
73. Id. at 230. 
74. Id. at 230. Professor Widner attributes the "heightened salience of ethnici- 
ty in politics" to "single-party monopoly and increasing political repression." Id. at 
231. 
75. "Dependency in Kenya is mental as well as material. We have been de- 
prived of the opportunity to act and to realize our creative potential as individuals 
and as a nation." INDEPENDENT KENYA, supm note 7, at 67. 
76. OJWANG, supm note 1, at 51. 
77. Id. A party code of discipline has now been adopted by the KANU and is 
used to settle party conflicts. Id. at 59. 
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We was a believer in a one-party State . . . under which 
individuals were allowed to express their opinions. However, 
when a group of individuals tried to suppress the views of 
those with whom they differed and to appoint themselves the 
sole spokesmen of the party and the government, a one-party 
State became a mockery." 
Because the KANU had become a tool for the expansion of 
the powers of the Executive and of the individual party leaders, 
it ceased to be an effective voice for the people. The power of 
the KANU party increased in the years following the adoption 
of the Constitutional Amendment, to the point that the KANU 
party became "the undisputed centre of political power, where 
independent policies are formulated and implemented without 
necessarily having to seek legislative appr~val."'~ 
Near the end of his leadership, Kenyatta began to concen- 
trate power and wealth in his family and the Kikuyu tribe, to 
which he belonged. He used his presidential influence "to ob- 
tain business contracts, trading privileges, and private proper- 
ty."80 Although the latter part of Kenyatta's rule was char- 
acterized by inequity and corruption, he was forgiven by the 
Kenyan people because of his status as the Father of the Na- 
tion. Moi, his successor, did not enjoy such reverence, and has 
had to fight more strenuously to maintain the reigns of power. 
4. The Kenyan Judiciary does not provide a check on the 
W U  
A one-party system is particularly ineffective in protecting 
individual rights in Kenya because the Kenyan Judiciary "still 
shares many traits with the British Judiciary. The main trait 
is a commitment to restraint and an acceptance of the 
Executive's policy guidance, where the policy is embodied in 
definite legal instruments or in recognized principles of law? 
Because the Judiciary defers to the Executive in issues of indi- 
vidual rights, there is no effective check on the power concen- 
trated in the Executive. The following two cases illustrate the 
point. 
In Ooko v. ~ e ~ u b l i c ' ~  the plaintiff was suing for unlawful 
78. OJWANG, supra note 1, at 51-52 (quoting East &can Standard (Nairobi), 
May 19, 1966). 
79. OJWANG, supm note 1, at 59. 
80. MILLER & YEAGER, supm note 7, at 57. 
81. OJWANG, supm note 1, at 213. 
82. See G. Karnau Kuria and J.B. Ojwang, Judges and the Rule of Law in 
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detention and for failure of the authorities to comply with con- 
stitutional provisions requiring the submission of an official 
statement immediately upon detention of a citizen which sets 
out the justification therefore. The court refused to investigate 
the merits of the claim, and instead assumed that the claims of 
the government were true. And procedurally, since "the 
grounds stated are capable of justifying the detention [the 
judge claimed he had] no power to order Mr. Ooko's relea~e."~ 
J.B. Ojwang and G. Kamau Kuria claim that in this decision 
the court denied "it had authority to question executive deci- 
sion in some cases even if such decisions were in derogation of 
rights guaranteed under the Con~titution."~~ 
In Kaggia v. ~ e ~ u b l i c , ~ ~  the defendant was found guilty of 
holding an unlawful meeting under the Public Order Act. The 
defendant had attended a Kenya's People Union meeting where 
he made a speech which led to the cancellation of the meeting. 
Although the meeting would probably have qualified as "com- 
mercial" and would be exempt from the Public Order Act, the 
court affirmed the conviction without addressing the constitu- 
tionally guaranteed freedom of assembly. Again, the 
government's actions in the area of personal liberties were 
afforded extraordinary deferen~e.~~ 
Therefore, because the judiciary cannot act as an effective 
check on the power of the Executive, the dangers of a one-party 
system are pronounced. The power passed by the British to a 
group of Kenyan leaders may have been concentrated necessar- 
ily at the outset to create unity, but there have been no sub- 
sequent steps taken by the Kenyan government to advance 
towards a more democratic governance. Instead, individual 
rights have been suppressed in order to ensure the continued 
dominance of the KANU party. 
the Framework of Politics: The Kenya Case, 1979 PUB. L. 254, 272-73, for a discus- 
sion of the case. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 269. 
85. See id. at 273, for a discussion of the case. 
86. The Kenyan high court did grant relief to FORD when they protested 
over the inadequate warning given by Moi of the 1992 elections. Moi, in an effort 
to limit political participation, announced in October that the national elections 
would be held on December 7th. The Kenyan High Court set December 29th as 
the new election date. 
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The Kenyan government often accumulates power and en- 
sures its stability by using the clauses in the Constitution that 
allow a violation of rights in situations where the interests of 
the nation are jeopardized. Beyond this, however, there exists 
an important cultural source of disrespect for the individual 
rights recognized in the Independence Constitution. The tradi- 
tional definition in Kenyan culture of "rights" is less individu- 
alistic and more contingent upon group interests than the 
Western concept of rights, such that the enforcement of the 
Constitution's individual protections has proven lackluster by 
western standards. The melding of the language of the Consti- 
tution and the culture is not surprising. It  was assumed at the 
outset, or should have been so assumed, "that the model of the 
constitution which came with independence would adjust to the 
real life of the Kenyan pe~ple."~' 
A. The Preservation of Kenyan Culture 
It may be surprising that the cultural foundations of Ken- 
yan society remain so resistant to changeso firmly and purely 
traditional. The Kenyans encountered foreign Western influenc- 
es as early as 1498, over 75 percent of Kenya's population has 
been baptized into Christianity:' and the Kenyans were ruled 
for more than 65 years by a Western culture who, in their 
determination to create a "White Man's Country," replaced 
many of Kenya's traditional government structure. Despite out- 
ward control, however, neither proselytization nor foreign gov- 
ernance succeeded in supplanting the deep currents of &can 
culture. 
The missionaries who came to Kenya had as their goal 
disorienting their objects of mission fkom 'pagan, savage, 
primitive and barbaric' traditions. The practical objective was 
to turn the prospective converts into replicas of the mission- 
ary. . . . On such a scale the missionary could measure his 
progress in terms of the degree to which his converts imitated 
him .89 
87. OJWANG, supra note 1, at 211-12. 
88. THEMES IN KENYAN HISTORY 86 (William R. Ochieng' ed., 1990). 
89. MUGAMBI, supm note 66, at 8. Contrary instructions were given, if not 
heeded, by Pope Gregory XV in 1622 in the Sacred Congregation for the 
Propagation of the Faith (the "Propaganda"). Vicars apostolic were admonished to 
introduce to foreign people 
668 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
The Kenyan converts were not replicas of the missionaries, 
however. J.N.K. Mugumbi states that "beneath the veneer of 
imported ecclesiastical institutions African Christians remain 
Afri~an."~' Indeed because Christian missionaries also intro- 
duced literacy and medicine, "[r]eligious affiliation tended to be 
linked with the religious denomination that managed the 
school or hospital one went to."' Therefore, the christianiza- 
tion was compartmentalized and did little to change the 
Kenyans' core cultural beliefs.92 
Similarly, the imposition of foreign rule did not remove the 
cultural foundations. A major element in the African cul- 
ture-the communityltribal identity-was even emphasized by 
early European conquerors under the maxim "divide and rule" 
to avoid a united uprising.93 The community groups that had 
developed around ethnic groups were actually strengthened 
during the colonial period, and, ironically, "some of them 
turned into important instruments of r e s i s t a n ~ e . ~ ~  
B. The Importance of the Community 
The idea of community identification is "central in African 
An individual in traditional Africa gains 
only the faith, which does not despise or destroy the manners and cus- 
toms of any people. . . . It is the nature of men to love and treasure 
above everything else their own country and that which belongs to it; in 
consequence there is no stronger cause for alienation and hate than an 
attack on local customs, especially when these go back to a venerable 
antiquity. 
STEPHEN NEILL, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS 152-53 (2d ed. 1986). 
90.. MUGAMBI, supra note 61, at 9; see also MUNRO, supra note 7, at  98-122. 
91. THEMES IN KENYAN HISTORY, supm note 88, at  86. 
92. The controversy surrounding female circumcision is an example of the 
dedication of African Christians to their cultural ties. For traditional Kikuyus, "the 
circumcision of both boys and girls had been an integral part of the initiation of 
young Kikuyu into adulthood." MARSHALL S. CLOUGH, FIGHTING TWO SIDES 138 
(1990). Jomo Kenyatta stated that circumcision was part of the moral code of the 
tribe and that "it symbolizes the unification of the whole tribal organization." Id. 
The missions took a position against female circumcision and encouraged their 
converts to do likewise. But the tradition was well rooted in the African culture. 
Id. at  138-39. The conflict between the missions and those who were determined to 
practice female circumcision led the natives to form independent schools and to 
create their own christian churches. See id. pp. 138-50, for a detailed history of 
the conflict. See also KENYAZTA, supra note 2, at  130-35. 
93. MUGAMBI, supra note 66, at 136. 
94. INDEPENDENT KENYA, supra note 7, at 73. 
95. MUGAMBI, supra note 66, at  136; see also DAVID.PARKIN, THE CULTURAL 
DEFINITION OF POLITICAL RESPONSE (1978). 
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personhood through his role in the group, and "social identity 
therefore takes priority over individual self-esteem."96 Com- 
munities may form around family ties, shared language, locali- 
ty or ethnicity, and even occupational niches.g7 But regardless 
of the group a Kenyan identifies with, and even though the 
community unit is no longer the rule-making body, the idea of 
the community affects the operation of Kenyan law now be- 
cause the community drives the definition of rights. 
Raymond Verdier calls the African concept of right "a com- 
munity phenomenon, which conceives of the individual and the 
group as complementary. This complementary concept leads to 
fundamental consequences within the legal sphere."98 He 
identifies the characteristics of the rights given in a community 
in the following ways. First, an individual's rights are con- 
strued as part of an interpersonal relationship. Property rights 
are not individual as they are in Western thought; an item of 
property is an "asset" of the community "which serves the func- 
tion of a link between the members of the comm~ni ty ."~~ Sec-
ond, a right connotes a duty. There is a reciprocity established 
between the one exercising the right and the one the right is 
exercised upon. The duty is part of a right that is given to the 
individual by the ~omrnunity.'~ Third, the rights of the 
individual are determined by the function he or she fulfills in 
the community and they will change as the individual's role 
changes. lo' 
Because the individual's rights are defined by the commu- 
nity, it is easy to see how they could be eliminated without 
argument fkom the native citizens if it were perceived that the 
good of the community and the role they were to play within 
96. MUGAMBI, supra note 66, at 135. 
97. See CHARLES H. AMBLER, KENYAN COMMUNITIES IN THE AGE OF IMPERIAL 
ISM 31-36 (1988) (The traditional relationships are a "complex world of overlapping, 
layered and shifting association."). 
98. Raymond Verdier, Customary Family Law, at  98. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 98-9. Raymond defines a fourth aspect of the idea of communi- 
ty-that the legal system includes "the deceased persons who have obtained the 
rank of ancestors"-which does not relate to the definition of individual rights but 
instead explains the fervor with which the Kenyans cling to customary practices. 
Ancestors are not only included in the community, they are considered guardians 
who insure the observance of community customs and traditions. Traditional 
thought is that if the customary practices are not observed, the community will be 
destroyed. Mulago, supra note 66, at 127. Thus, the community viewed customary 
practices as the basis for the community's well-being. 
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the community called for such elimination. In addition, it 
makes the definition of a "democratic" government in Kenya 
more problematic for Western scholars because the voice of the 
people may not demand democratic rights. Is it then the re- 
sponsibility of Western powers to "enlighten" the African people 
as to a new conceptualization of rights or should the traditional 
idea of rights relative to the community be respected and left 
unchallenged? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
At a basic level, Kenya shows only that the creation of a 
democratic nation may be gradual and must account for the 
melding of law with native reality. And Kenyans, after all, "[iln 
terms of their freedoms, rights, and opportunities for self-ad- 
vancement," are probably better off than most of their African 
 counterpart^.'^^ There are however, important developments 
since the initiation of Kenyan self-rule that point to a move- 
ment away from rather than toward democracy. Kenyan lead- 
ers have never effectively turned governing power over to the 
native people, but have instead acted to solidify their positions 
of power by manipulating elections, perpetuating a one-party 
state, and repressing individual rights. Even though democratic 
structures must conform to cultural contours, the tribal defini- 
tion of individual rights should not be used to mask the estab- 
lished Kenyan leaders' will to power. Indeed, the Kenyan no- 
tion of rights seeks the good of the community, rather than 
that of the entrenched leadership. 
Lindsey Gustafson 
102. MILLER & YEAGER, supra note 7, at 59. 
